OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55) AGE 2

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	OUTSIDE RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
1800Scat.	15 Mi.	SE AT 16 Kts	74°F	- - -	65	30.15

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS *(winds aloft, icing levels, state of sea, etc., if pertinent to accident)*

Wind Rel. To Hdg. Left 30°

8. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CAUSE FACTORS

ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S
PILOT ERROR			LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER ERROR			MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION		
CREW ERROR			OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR, Specify			MATERIAL INADEQUACY		
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ERROR			ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR			ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ROUGH SEAS		
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ERROR			AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES			UNDETERMINED		X
SERVICING PERSONNEL ERROR			WEATHER			OTHER, Specify		

9. PERSONNEL

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS *(Complete following Section on Pilot)*

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	**5. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED**	**6. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS**

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

1. AIRCRAFT HISTORY

DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
Accepted 6/25/45	5	23	4	1371.1	6032.2	4/1/57 120Hr. Check Acceptance	21.4	22
	ENGINE MODEL	SERIAL NO. OF ENGINE						
Not Avail.	R-1340-AN1	110116	3	301	1079	4/1/57 120Hr. Acceptance	21.4	22

2. ENGINE HISTORY

NO. 4 NO. 3 NO. 2 NO.

3. GENERAL

a. DID FIRE OCCUR: ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☒ AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FUR SERIAL

d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED ☒ YES ☐ NO

e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED

4. ETC MAJOR AND ENG. FACTORS

CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ AIRCRAFT DESIGN

b. ☐ AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

c. ☐ MAINTENANCE

d. ☒ UNDETERMINED

e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

f. ☐ OTHER, Specify

g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES

h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configurations)

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5. ENGINEERING DATA

A. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	B. AIR SPEED (KEY)	C. OPERATING TEMPERATURE	D. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	E. C.G. (% MAC)	F. KIND OF FUEL	G. FUEL PRESSURE
	130		5,000		91-96	UND

H. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION: NONE

I. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT

J. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR *(List Stock and Ser. nos., give time since new or overhauled)*

K. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C: NA

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750-

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

SECTION B – FACILITIES DATA

1. GENERIC MATERIAL FACILITIES INVOLVED, DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION.

a. ☐ CLEARANCE AUTHORITY	h. ☐ RUNWAY	o. ☐ EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)
b. ☐ FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE	i. ☐ WATER LANDING AREA	p. ☐ AIRCRAFT SERVICING, HANDLING & DIRECTING (Field or Shi,
c. ☐ LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, etc.)	j. ☐ APPROACH ZONE	q. ☐ CRASH AND RESCUE
d. ☐ TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)	k. ☐ END ZONE	r. ☐ SEARCH AND RESCUE
e. ☐ APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION	l. ☐ SHOULDERS	s. ☐ CATAPULT
f. ☐ RUNWAY WATCH	m. ☐ TAXIWAY	t. ☐ ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
g. ☐ LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	n. ☐ PARKING AREA	u. ☐ BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
w. ☐ OTHER, Specify		v. ☐ FLIGHT DECK

2. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR

A.	B. PRESSURE SETTINGS	C. WIND OVER DECK	D. RELATIVE HEADWIND	E. APPROACH SPEED (IAS) READ.NAT

F. MARK NUMBER	G. MODEL NO.	H. LOCATION ON SHIP	I. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION US

J. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

K. THIS PORTION SHALL BE COMPLETED WHENEVER (1) A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT, OR (2) AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES MALFUNCTIONING OF ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT. MINOR ACCIDENTS OR ROUTINE DAMAGE TO CABLES, WELDINGS AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE REPORTED.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings since last inspection)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART | SECT. | ITEM | PART III – REMARKS (continue on separate pages if necessary)

Copies:

2cc Aviation Safety Center NORVA (Direct Air Mail)
1cc BUAER (Aer 512)
1cc BAR, NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. COLUMBUS DIV. 4300 E, 5TH. AVE., COLUMBUS, OHIO
1cc BARIN
1cc SAUFLEY, 1cc WHITING
No Damage to Public or Private Property.

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PART IV – SIGNATURES (INDICATE DATE SUBMITTED BY C.O.) 10 MAY 1957

(b) (6)
(b)
CDR, USN
NAAS CORRY FIELD AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER UNIT BILLET

(b) (6)
T, USN
BTG AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER UNIT BILLET

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
LT, MC, USNR
(flight surgeon member)

(b) (6)
LT, USN
BTG-2 AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER (member) UNIT BILLE

PART V. THE ACCIDENT

SNJ 2C-253, BuNo 112278 departed NAS CORRY FIELD at approximately 1010 CST, on Tuesday, 23 April 1957. The flight was a precision two (2) solo training syllabus flight. The pilot was NavCad George Windsor CHIHULY. Following take-off and climbout, the student pilot intended to perform regular syllabus maneuvers which included wing-overs and Chandelles for high work, and several touch and go landings at OLF, Choctaw. It is assumed that regular syllabus maneuvers were practiced until the aircraft entered a spin and spun to the earth, crashed and burned.

PART VI. DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

Damages sustained as a result of the crash were classified AIF. Impact damage was severe, however, fire following impact caused additional damage and burned the fuselage and right wing to complete destruction. The unburned items were the left wing, which was severely buckled and wrinkled; the engine, which was buried deep in the sand; and the pitot tube that was driven full length into the earth. The fire resulted from an accumulation of fuel in a low area, ditch line of a road, underneath the right wing. All fuel cells were ruptured on impact. The engine was turned in to NAS, Pensacola, O & R for DIR. The remaining wreckage was turned in to NAS, Pensacola for salvage.

PART VII. THE INVESTIGATION

A. The flight was scheduled and authorized. The flight was a Precision Stage two (2) solo flight.

B. The flight started at approximately 1010 CST, Tuesday, 23 April 1957 at NAS CORRY FIELD, in an SNJ-6 Side Number 2C-253, BuNo 112278, and ended 4.59 Miles South of Bagdad, Florida. The bearing and distance from NAS CORRY FIELD was 053°17 miles. The exact location is in NE ¼ SE ¼ Sect. 2 Range 28 West Township 1 South in a tract known as N ½ of Gov't. Lot No. 7.

Cont'd on next page

PART VII. THE INVESTIGATION, Cont'd

C. The total flight time was approximately 39 Minutes.

D. The pilot made the routine solo radio check with N.A.S CORRY tower prior to leaving the chocks. This was the last transmission received by N.A.S CORRY from this aircraft. A check of tower tapes revealed no transmissions from 2C-253 following the solo radio check.

E. The next known event during the flight was observed by an Instructor LTJG (b) (6) and his flight student (b) (6), NavCad from N.A.S SAUFLEY FIELD. (b) (6) and student were at 5,000 ft. in slow flight on an easterly heading when 2C-253 spun by them. (b) (6) took control of his aircraft and followed 2C-253. At 3,500 ft. (b) (6) reported to N.A.S SAUFLEY that an SNJ was spinning in and would hit any minute. The SNJ continued to spin. (b) (6) and student related that CHIHULY was erect in the cockpit, and that the cockpit canopy was closed. There apparently was no attempt made to recover from the spin. (b) (6) did not observe the actual impact as at that instant the spinning aircraft was underneath the wing of the observing aircraft. The SNJ, 2C-253, struck the earth in a normal spin and shortly thereafter burned.

F. (b) (6) remained at 1,000 ft. until S.R aircraft arrived.

G. The canopy of 2C-253 was closed throughout the spin according to eye witnesses, and according to all indications revealed upon investigation.

H. The aircraft struck the ground in a spin with an angle of impact of approximately 75° with an attitude of 75° nose low as indicated by the wing chord relative to the road bed upon which it rested, and angle of the pitot tube that buried in the sand completely to the leading edge of the wing. The pitot tube was driven into the ground with little evidence of twisting or rotation. At the one (1) ft. and a quarter (.25) in point from tip end of the pitot tube, the degree of bend due to aircraft rotation was 1.5° increasing to 2.5° then smoothing out again. Cont'd on next Page.

PART VII. THE INVESTIGATION, Cont'd

This information roughly checks with data reported by NACA Tech Note 2485 of OCT 1951. For a similar weight aircraft in a steep spin the forward velocity during a steady spin is 211 ft./sec. while the rotation rate is .41 rotations per second. Proportioning this to the three (3) ft. length of the pitot tube, the degree of rotation for that distance of forward travel would be approximately 2.1°. The wing span, the increment of rotation per foor, etc., have not been considered in this proportion. The tangent of 2.1° times the span of the win, equals roughly the distance that the left wing moved following initial impact on the roadbed. This distance measures and computes to be approximately 9.2 inches. The significance of the proportion is that the rotation rate is only 0.19% of the forward velocity compared on a time basis. This would explain the lack of bending in the pitot tube and the relatively small area covered by the wreckage. The major portion of the wreckage was found primarily in the parameters of the SNJ for a 75° attitude impact. Small objects such as bits of plexiglass were spread in an arc to the right of the point of impact. The wind at the time of impact was 30° left of the aircraft heading at impact. The wind had little effect in the distribution pattern.

I. The pilot was thrown clear of the wreckage. The body was 11 ft. from the cockpit on a relative bearing of 26.5° degrees right.

J. Although fire consumed most of the aircraft, the clothing of the pilot was not burned which indicates that fire occurred following the impact. Other evidence also pointed out that fire occurred following impact and not in flight.

K. From best information and investigation, the aircraft was intact on impact.

L. The existing control cables were intact, however, some were badly burned, mixed in with melted aluminum, and slipped from shivs and control surfaces as a result of the impact forces and ensuing fire. Cont'd on next Page

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PART VII. THE INVESTIGATION, Cont'd

M. The first people to arrive at the scene were two farmers, a Mr. O. H. POTTS, (b) (6) and Mr. Buck LEEPARD, (b) (6) The farmers have some knowledge of aircraft as both had worked for the Navy or Air Force at one time or another during the past two wars. The farmers noted the position of the crash and the fact that the pilot was clear of the crash and beyond help. They checked the crash for a second pilot but could not determine whether a second pilot was in the crash due to the intensity of the gasoline fire burning in the area of right wing and empennage. The farmers then took charge of the scene and attempted to keep sight seers out of the area of the crash until the S.R helicopter arrived. Mr. LEEPARD then returned to his home but Mr. POTTS remained at the scene for the remainder of day and rendered valuable assistance to the investigating parties.

N. Crash and Fire trucks were dispatched from NAAS WHITING FIELD. The fire was extinguished by these crews and their equipment.

O. Ambulance and crew arrived from NAAS WHITING and handled all the personal details concerning the pilot. Two Flight Surgeons were with this crew.

P. A Flight Surgeon, an Aviation Safety Officer, and a photographer arrived at the scene from NAAS CORRY FIELD approximately 45 minutes following the crash. The investigation began while the Flight Surgeon assisted the Flight Surgeon's from Whiting Field.

Q. NAAS ELLYSON FIELD supplied a Helicopter for transportation. This assistance was invaluable as the location of the occurrence was approximately 25 miles from NAAS CORRY FIELD by land routes.

R. Additional assistance from NAAS CORRY FIELD arrived by automobile.

S. State Patrol and local Milton Shore Patrol arrived at the scene approximately 40 minutes following the crash. These forces were of great assistance in handling the flow of traffic, and the curtailment of inquisitive sight seers in picking up pieces of the wreckage, etc.

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PART II. THE INVESTIGATION, Cont'd

T. The heading of the aircraft on impact was 210° (M). This reading was also found on the directional gyro from the front cockpit.

U. The attitude of aircraft on impact was nose low (75°), slightly right wing low. The point of impact was a road shoulder and ditch line with the low side to the right side of the aircraft.

V. Safety devices utilized were H-3 helment, parachute, and possibly goggles. Position of the shoulder harness in the back seat was definitely locked and secured as required on solo flights. The shoulder straps in the front seat were apparently locked but not in position across the shoulders nor in the locking hardware of the seat belt. One shoulder strap was found almost complete. This one showed no evidence of strain other than cuts and burns incurred from impact damage and fire. The front seat belt hardware was found in opposite positions in the accessory section of the engine, which indicates they were unfastened. The pilot was not secured in the seat by seat belt and shoulder straps

W. Investigation of the wreckage revealed the following:

(1) All control surfaces were attached to the aircraft at time of impact. The full surfaces were not available as they had been consumed by the fire.

(2) The wheels and flaps were in the UP position.

(3) The canopy was in the fully closed position. The hand grip of the canopy opening latch was found under the body at scene. (b) (6) (b) (6) (See Medical Officer Report)

(4) The fuel selector valve in the rear cockpit was on the LEFT tank, however the gas selector valve was broken indicating damage on impact. The selector valve in the front cockpit was on the Reserve position.

(5) There was no evidence of structural failure or engine malfunction.

(6) Trim settings were- 1230 O'clock rudder, 0300 O'clock elevator.

(7) Both instrument panels were found and the readings were:

(a) Airspeed - approximately 130 knots. Cont'd on next Page.

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PART VII. THE INVESTIGATION, Cont'd

(b) Fuel pressure - undetermined

(c) Fuel quantity - undetermined although sufficient to cause extensive fire damage.

(d) Gear and Flap indicators - UP

(e) Manifold pressure - 32 in Hg.

(f) RPM - 2,075 turns per minute

(g) Turning rate - Front cockpit read two needle width, rear cockpit read fully pegged, both deflected to the right.

(h) Rate of Climb/Descent - Undetermined. Black light showed some indications of a reading at climb 1800 fpm. This could be a reverse reading provided the needle in the descent could by-pass the peg. In this case the rate of descent would have read 12,000 fpm. The time from 5,000 ft. altitude to the deck was about 25 seconds as derived from the NAS Saufley Tower recording tape. This computes at the same rate of descent.

(i) The front cockpit clock stopped at 1049 CST.

(j) Hydraulic pressure gauge - 500 psi (loss of hydraulic press. and impact damage caused this reading as the needle is actually spring loaded and would peg if no press in lines).

(k) Magneto Switch - OFF- Reason undetermined

(l) Throttle, Mixture, Propeller - Forward, prop at 1950 RPM position

(m) VHF Radio control box - Channel FIVE (5), Receive on GUARD

(8) (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] however, the pilot was in good health and had eaten regular meals. There was no way of determining presence of hyper-ventilation and whether or not it was a factor involved. Cont'd on next Page

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PART VII. THE INVESTIGATION, Cont'd

(9) Wreckage distribution is portrayed in attached pictures and the wreckage diagram.

X. Engine Disassembly Inspection and Report is not available at this time. Supplementary information will be forwarded as applicable.

Y. Examination of NavCad CHIHULY's flight progress records reveals the following:

(1) Total flying hours were 58.0 of which 13.5 were solo.

Total flight time in SNJ; 19.8 of which 17.9 was dual.

Primary time in the T-34 was 38.2 of which 11.6 were solo.

(2) Overall numerical flight training grade was 3.098 which comprises the following:

T-34		T-34
Pre-Solo	3.13	Hrs solo 11.6 30 flights total
Precision	3.13	Hrs. dual 26.6
SNJ		SNJ
Transition	3.06	Hrs. solo 1.9
Precision	3.07	Hrs. dual 17.9 [illegible] 15 flts total

(3) Grade based on 3.00 as being average.

Z. Communications during this accident were poor. The Corry Tower received meager details from Saufley Tower. An incorrect side number was reported which did not check with any aircraft assigned to NAAS Corry. Follow up information to NAAS Whiting was by telephone to the Aviation Safety Office from the Corry Safety Office. Aircraft at the scene of the accident did not zoom the crash crew at OLF, Bagdad which delayed the arrival of the nearest fire fighting equipment.

Additional comments considered:

Total time in flight was not sufficient to burn dry any tank provided normal consumption and no leaks present.

Landings are not recorded at OLF, Bagdad, therefore it was not possible to check on the possibility of this aircraft having been in that landing pattern. Sand bag ballast was not positively identified in wreckage.

PART VIII. THE ANALYSIS

A. NavCad CHIHULY was on an authorized flight in an authorized area at the time of the accident.

B. The crash site was established at 4.59 miles South of the Bagdad School, in the city of Bagdad, Florida, along highway State 191, commonly called the "Bay Point Road". The crash was on the West side of the road and contained within the highway right of way.

C. The pilot was positively identified as NavCad George Windsor CHIHULY, (b) (6) USNR, through finger prints, dental inspection, I. D. photo comparison, and flight schedule information from BTG-2.

D. NavCad CHIHULY was airborne approximately 39 minutes. The time of impact registered by the stopped cockpit clock was 1049 CST. The autopsy report, however, stated that death occurred at 1040 CST.

E. Weather at the scene was scattered cumulus, visibility unlimited, wind 160° to 170° at 15 to 18 knots.

F. The aircraft was first observed at 5,000 ft. above the area of crash, in a normal spin to the right.

G. The pilot was erect in the seat, the canopy was closed. No apparent attempt to recover from the spin was observed.

H. The aircraft was under observation until just prior to impact, at which time it was lost under the wing of the observing aircraft that was executing a spiral in an attempt to keep contact with the spinning SNJ.

I. There was no apparent malfunction of the engine, and no apparent structural failure prior to initial contact with the ground.

J. The aircraft struck at a high rate of descent, at an attitude of 75° nose low and an angle of impact of 75° with an approximate air speed of 130 knots and in a clean configuration. Cont'd on next Page

PART VIII. THE ANALYSIS, Cont'd

K. The impact force ruptured the fuel cells and spilled the gasoline into the ditch line where fire occurred and caused extreme damage to the wreckage. The impact forces also ruptured the fuselage. The pilot was thrown clear of the wreckage (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

The canopy release handle was broken at 3.5 inches from the end of the handle. (b) (6) as would occur if he had hold of the handle on impact. The broken part of the handle was underneath the body of the pilot. Evidentlly an attempt to leave the aircraft was in progress but altitude and time had run out. The indications of the shoulder harness and seat belt being unfastened also support the idea that a bail out attempt was in progress or had been attempted and aborted. Had the shoulder harness been securely fastened, however, the pilot in all probability would have sufferred MFA injuries.

L. The aircraft was spinning, a manouver which is not a part of a P-2 solo flight. Whether the spin was accidental or intentional is not known. The instruments, throttle quadrant, and other details revealed during investigation indicate a power on spin which is definitely not a part of the syllabus and would therefore be presumed as accidental.

M. The parachute was on the pilot and was cut free to extricate the body. The "D" ring was not in place but evidently had been displaced during impact. No evidence of an attempt to utilize the chute was found as the second locking pin was still in place.

N. The speed on impact has been determined by ultra violet light reading at the Overhaul and Repair Department, NAS, Pensacola, Florida, as 130 knots indicated. The reading was not positive as foam had removed most of the fluorescent material from the dial. Cont'd on next Page

PART VIII. THE ANALYSIS, Cont'd

O. The engine was at approximately 2075 rpm at the time of impact. This reading is also from ultra violet light. The propeller blade angle as determined by O & R, NAS, Pensacola was 15 degrees. Investigation at O & R revealed no indication of prop overspeed or mal-function.

P. As far as can be determined, the aircraft was functioning properly and normally under spinning conditions at the time of the crash.

Q. A sand bag in the aircraft was not positively identified, therefore the spin characteristics of an SNJ without ballast in the luggage compartment is now under study and should information pertinent to the determination of the cause of this accident be revealed, a supplementary report will be forwardd.

R. The location of the crash along the road is coincidental or by chance. No attempt to land was in progress. This is the acrobatic area above 6,000 ft. for SNJ's, unfortunately most of the area is over water with the one peninsula in the middle. This land provides ground reference for the orientation of maneuvers. This is the most likely reason that the pilot was in the area.

S. No reports of mid-air collisions or near misses have been reported since the occurrence, and is therefore not considered a factor.

T. NavCad CHIHULY, by all established criteria, was an average to above flight student, and had no mental or physical problems which would render him unfit for the actual control of aircraft.

U. The SAR facilities utilized were considered adequate on this occasion.

V. The nearest fire fighting and rescue equipment station, at OLF, Bagdad and NAAS WHITING FIELD's, were not informed of the fact that a crash had occurred as expeditiously as should have been and consequently were delayed in their arrival at the scene.

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PART IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions:

1. The primary cause of the accident is undetermined.

2. A probable cause of the accident is a combination of a lack of experience and some degree of unfamiliarity with the type aircraft coupled with possible anxiety reactions when the pilot was faced with this situation. The spin most likely occurred while practicing acrobatics. The forward directional gyro being uncaged and on an approximate heading of the aircraft may indicate that heading control during the maneuver was primarily by this instrument and not by ground reference points. The spin probably occurred while the pilot was concentrating, or fascinated, on/by the instrument . Possibly not recognizing the accidental spin, back pressure and aileron were applied to stop the rotation but to no avail. This would probably confuse or panic most students momentarily. Then realizing the situation after much altitude had been lost, an attempt to bail-out was initiated. It is conceivable that he grabbed the release handle of the canopy while unbuckling the seat belt. The release of the seat belt may have made the operation of the canopy difficult by the loss of leverage through "g" forces acting in different directions than normally experienced. This may have been the reason why the canopy was not opened. Had ample time been available, a satisfactory escape could have been performed by use of the emergency escape panel. From 5,000 ft. at 211 ft/sec the time for action would be about 23.6 seconds.

B. Recommendations:

1. That pilots and students be continually reminded of proper escape procedures from spinning aircraft.

2. That pilots train themselves for a situation such as this and be prepared to jump if recovery from a spin is not effected by 5,000 ft. of altitude as required by CNABATRA INSTR 3750.9. Cont'd on next page

PART IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Cont'd

3. That radio procedure and air discipline be continually stressed. During emergencies only known facts must be reported. If information is doubtful, it should be so qualified.

4. That pilots know emergency procedures and be able to alert crash crews and direct them to the scene of the accident. USE Type Aircraft Emergency Procedure flip charts provided.

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
NORTH
REFERENCE POINT FOR DIAGRAM
26
0229(11)
ENCLOSURE(8)
STATE HIGHWAY 191
WEST
EAST
SOUTH
WING SPAN
ALL BEARINGS MAG.
SCALE 1"=10'
SE 12 KTS.
WIND

ITEM	DIST. FT.	BRG. (M)	
1	16.2"	220°	Plexiglass
2	15.2	252°	6x6 Plexiglass
3	16.3	241°	Plexiglass
4	18.5	250°	Rear seat altimeter
5	27.4	232°	Small Al. Brace
6	25.6'	274°	Bake lite item
7	29.0	235°	Plexiglass
8	28.75	225°	Plexiglass
9	33.6'	225°	Plexiglass
10	38.0'	226°	Radio Equipment
11	48.8'	240°	Plexiglass
12	46.0'	262°	Plexiglass
13	52.0'	225°	
14	57.0	230°	Small metal item
15	59.11	225°	Plexiglass
16	62.6'	215°	Stb. run. light
17	46.8'	200°	Wind Shield
18	49.9	197°	Stb. run. light
19	35.6	202°	Wind Shield
20	29.4'	200°	Plexiglass
21	22.4'	205°	Stb. skin FWD.
22	29.9	201°	Glass
23	23.11	190°	CO_2 Nozzle
24	23.10'	190°	Bake lite stick grip
25	27.9'	186°	Metal
26	27.9'	186°	Canopy Panel
27	30.00	189°	FWP. upper Ant. mastr pack
28	36'	192°	Chute
29	36.	192°	Oil filter
30	35.0	175°	Radio Jack helment
31	31.3	165°	Wind Shield side panel frame & glass
32	29.2"	157°	Lip mike
33	43.10"	174°	Pilot's wrist watch
34	46.10'	180°	Cock pit emergency release
35	46.10	180°	Helment
36	42.4'	189°	C. P. Canopy Glass
37	36.9	185°	C. P. Canopy Glass
38	27.5'	165°	Pilot

MAIN WRECKAGE

A	31	130°	Beginning port wing root
B	47'11	135°	Port wing tip
C	25'6	140°	Cockpit area
D	20'3	160°	Engine area
E	21'2"	142°	Starboard wing root
F	8' 5"	170°	Stb. wing tip
G	15'7"	130°	Tail wheel and strut
H	17'10"	160°	Vert. stablizer, rudder brace
I	15'2"	181°	Starboard side fuselage panel

ENCLOSURE (8)



ENCL (9a) NAAS CORRY FLD., BTG-2, AAR12-57
AERIAL VIEW AT APPROXIMATELY 2 HRS
FOLLOWING CRASH.

ENCL (06) NAAS CORRY FLD. BTG-2
AAR 12-57, SHOWING LEFT WING
REMAINS OF FUSELAGE, LEFT VIEW



ENCL (9c) NAAS CORRY FLD, BTG-2, AAR 12-57
SHOWING LEFT REAR VIEW. SIDE NO. OF ACFT.
WAS 2C-253. MARKINGS SHOWN THIS VIEW WAS
THE ONLY CLUE TO SIDE NUMBER.

ENCL (9d) NAAS CORRY FLD. BTG-2, AAR 12-57
VIEW FROM RIGHT WING TIP


NUCL (97) NAAS CORRY FLD, PENSA
AAR R-5 SHOWING COCKPIT


ENCL (9a) NAAS CORRY FLD,
BTF-2, A/C R-57
SHOWING WING POSITIONS,
REMAINS OF FUSELAGE

AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE REPORT
NAVAER 5323 (12-45)

To be made out according to instructions contained in Aviation Circular Letter 124-45

1.	AIRCRAFT MODEL: SNJ-6	BUREAU NO.: 112278	STATION SUBMITTING REPORT: NAAS Whiting Field	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED: 4-25-57	ACFR No.: 5-57
2.	DATE OF ACCIDENT: 4-23-57	HOUR: 1030	SCENE OF ACCIDENT: 3 miles south of Bagdad, Florida	LOCATION: ☐ ON STATION ☒ OFF STATION	DISTANCE TO SCENE: App 12 miles
3. WEATHER	GENERAL: 3000 Ft Broken 12 miles vis.	TEMPERATURE: 81°F	REL. HUMIDITY: 65%	WIND DIRECTION: SE	VELOCITY: 12 knots
4.	INDICATE CLASSIFICATION OF CRASH (Check where applicable)	☐ NO FIRE ☒ FIRE	☐ TAKE-OFF ☐ LANDING	☒ ~~TAXI~~ EMERGENCY xxx in flight	☐ LINE EMERGENCY
5.	TIME OF ALARM: 1050	TIME FIRST APPARATUS ARRIVED: 1120	TIME FIRE OUT: 1122	ELAPSED TIME: 0 HR. 32 MIN.	QTY. GASOLINE: Less than 100 gal / NATURE OF GROUND SURFACE: Paved road

6. CRASH EQUIPMENT USED

TYPE (FFN, ETC.)	USN No.	SIZE CREW	MILITARY OR CIVILIAN	EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED: TYPE	QUANTITY	RADIO EQUIPPED	OTHER DATA
FFN-3	71-00315	6	1 Civilian 5 Military	Foam	1600 gal	Yes	

TOTAL No. PERSONNEL IN PLANE: One

7. RESCUE

	UNINJURED	INJURED	UNBURNED	MINOR BURNS	SERIOUS BURNS
NUMBER ESCAPED UNAIDED					
NUMBER RESCUED ALIVE					
NUMBER REMOVED DEAD		One	One		
LOCATION IN PLANE					
OTHER THAN OCCUPANTS					

42

8. MATERIAL DAMAGE

CAUSED BY CRASH	CAUSED BY FIRE
Strike	Strike

TO	INITIAL
CO	
XO	
CAD	
CAS	

9. FIRE-FIGHTING PERSONNEL

COGNIZANCE OVER CRASH CREW: ☐ STATION FIRE DEPARTMENT ☒ OPERATIONS OFFICER

TITLE OF PERSON IN CHARGE FIRE FIGHTERS AT SCENE: Civilian Driver-Operator, GS-5

10. CLEAR AND CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT AND METHOD USED IN CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

The aircraft crashed and burned approximately 3 miles south of the town of Bagdad, Florida, sustaining damage as noted above. The pilot was thrown clear of the air craft and apparently was killed on impact. Notification was made to the Whiting Field Operations Duty Officer by Saufley Field Operations at 1050 hours. The off-station crash truck was dispatched immediately upon notification proceeding to the scene via the route shown on attached sketch. Upon arrival at the scene the crash crew found the pilot dead and clear of the wreckage which was still burning. Action was taken immediately to extinguish the aircraft fire. Statement of the civilian driver operator is attached hereto.

16-10520-1

NAVAER 2325 (12-45) (BACK)

10. CLEAR AND CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT AND METHOD USED IN CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE OPERATIONS—*Continued.*

A crash rescue crew consisting of 2 men, with CO2 equipped weapons carrier was at at Bagdad Field approximately 3 miles from the scene at the time of the crash. The was not observed by this crew, consequently they were unaware of the occurrence of crash. No attempt was made by airborne aircraft to alert this crew and direct them to the scene. Statement of the petty officer in charge of the Bagdad Field crash crew is attached hereto.

4

11. DISTRIBUTION	12. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Orig. BuAer via [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] XX Orig: BuAer (SE743) Via: CNATRA CNABATRA cc: Corry AAR	Standard procedures require that airborne pilots shall alert all available rescue facilities upon observation of a crash. In the present case it would appear that no such action was taken by any airborne pilot to alert the Bagdad Field crash crew and direct them to the scene. In view of the fact that several aircraft were known to be in the immediate area at the time of the crash. It may be assumed that the incident was observed. Accordingly it is recommended that the responsibility of airborne pilots to alert available rescue facilities and direct them to the scene upon observation of a crash, be stressed in the aviation training programs of all units of the NABATRACOM. No other discrepancies were noted in the conduct of the crash/rescue operation.

13. THE ABOVE ARE TRUE STATEMENTS, BASED ON OPERATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS AT SCENE OF CRASH

SIGNED		SIGNED	
(b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] LT, USN	IN CHARGE, CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE.	D. J. HARRINGTON	COMMANDING OFFICER.

14.

INSTRUCTIONS

GENERAL

1. A report shall be submitted in **every** case that the Crash Fire and Rescue Crew answers an alarm involving aircraft.

2. Reports shall be prepared promptly and submitted to BuAer within 7 days by the Shore Station, or if the crash crew is a part of a Fleet Unit in an advance area, by the Fleet Unit, Acorn or Marine Air Squadron.

3. Submit photographs of crash and/or fire, if available.

4. Submit sketch showing location of crash, location of crash trucks before alarm, route of crash trucks to scene, and other pertinent details, if possible.

5. Include in report any additional enclosures, statements of personnel involved or other data that are considered desirable or that may add to an analysis of the report.

DETAILED EXPLANATION OF SECTIONS OF FORM

Sec. 1.—AIRCRAFT MODEL and BUREAU NUMBER are same as called for on NAVAER-339.

Sec. 2.—SCENE OF ACCIDENT—Give name of field or approximate location of scene of accident.
DISTANCE TO SCENE—Give distance from location of crash truck units to scene of crash, in feet or fractional miles.

Sec. 5.—TIME OF ALARM and TIME FIRST APPARATUS ARRIVED should be given to indicate difference in minutes and seconds.
ELAPSED TIME is from time of alarm to fire out.
QTY. GASOLINE—Give amount in crashed plane.

Sec. 6.—List *all* Fire and Rescue Trucks including any Pumpers, Ambulances, or specially equipped Jeeps, etc., that may respond.

Sec. 7.—List total number occupants at top and account for all occupants in columns below.

Sec. 8.—Give brief description in each column and an estimate in dollars, if at all possible.

Sec. 10.—Continue on separate sheet if necessary. Facts are important.

Sec. 11.—Add to distribution shown as necessary.

Sec. 12.—Any recommendation to correct deficiencies should be noted.


NAAS
N
W
E
S
MILTON
SANTA ROSA FIELD
BAGDAD
BAGDAD FIELD
MULAT
CRASH SITE
BLACKWATER BAY
CHOCTAW FIELD
EAST BAY
Sketch showing location of crash, location of crash trucks before alarm, and route of crash trucks to scene.
44
NER


LEFT WING






LOCATION OF BODY


Line of flight